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ON THE NEED TO EXPAND ARTICLE 23 OF 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
AARON C. LANG* 
INTRODUCTION 
A Geographical Indication of Origin (GI) is a place name that 
identifies the geographic source of a good and signifies a distinctive 
quality, reputation, or other characteristic of the good that is 
essentially attributable to that geographic source.1  Seeing the words 
“Parmigiano Reggiano” on a cylinder of cheese, for example, signals 
to a consumer that the cheese was produced in a particular region of 
Italy where the unique soil characteristics and climatic conditions 
make for a unique cheese.2 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS Agreement),3 the first multilateral instrument that 
deals with GIs,4  promulgates minimum standards of protection that 
WTO Members must provide for GIs.  Article 22 of the TRIPS 
Agreement requires that all Members make available the legal means 
to prevent the use of a GI that (1) indicates or suggests that a good 
originates in a geographical area other than the true place of origin in 
a manner that misleads the public as to the geographical origin; or (2) 
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 1. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRIPS: GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS—
BACKGROUND AND THE CURRENT SITUATION (2005), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
trips_e/gi_background_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS: GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS]. 
 2. See Bruce A. Babcock & Roxanne Clemens, Geographical Indications and Property 
Rights: Protecting Value-Added Agricultural Products 45 (Midwest Agribusiness Trade Research 
and Information Center, Briefing Paper No. 04-MBP 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/04mbp7.pdf. 
 3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 4. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 188 
(2d ed. 2003). 
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constitutes an act of unfair competition.5  However, for GIs on two 
and only two categories of goods—wines and spirits—Article 23 of 
TRIPS Agreement provides additional protections, the three most 
significant of which are discussed below. 
A. Level of Protection 
Under Article 22, the holder of an infringed GI only has access 
to legal recourse if consumers have been misled by the allegedly 
infringing label or if its sale constituted an act of unfair competition,6 
whereas Article 23 plainly prohibits any use of a GI on wines or 
spirits that do not originate in the designated geographical region—
whether or not the true origin is identified.7  In other words, “to 
prevent the illegitimate use of a GI under Article 23, the legitimate 
users of the GI only have to prove that the product on which the GI is 
used does not originate in the geographic area identified by its 
indication.”8 
B. Multilateral Register 
The last section of Article 23, which has no analogue in Article 
22, calls for negotiations to be undertaken in the Council for TRIPS 
concerning the establishment of a multilateral system of notification 
and registration for the GIs on eligible wines.9  It has been argued 
that Paragraph 18 of the Doha Declaration mandates that spirits 
should be covered by this system as well.10  Although the register does 
not give registered GIs any overt legal protections beyond those they 
would otherwise enjoy, it does facilitate the protection of such GIs.11 
 
 5. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 22.2. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. art. 23.1. 
 8. Felix Addor & Alexandra Grazioli, Geographical Indications Beyond Wines and Spirits: 
A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical Indications in the WTO/TRIPS Agreement, 
5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 865, 882 (2002). 
 9. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 23.4. 
 10. Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Note by the 
Secretariat: Discussions on the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and 
Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits ¶ 10, TN/IP/W/7/Rev.1 (May 23, 
2003) [hereinafter Discussions on the Establishment of a Multilateral System] (citing Council for 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Special Session, Minutes of Meeting of 28 
June 2002 ¶¶ 19, 25, 27, 30 & 32, TN/IP/M/2 (Aug. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Minutes of Meeting of 
28 June 2002]; Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Special 
Session, Minutes of Meeting of 20 September 2002 ¶ 12, TN/IP/M/3 (Oct. 21, 2002) [hereinafter 
Minutes of Meeting of 20 September 2002]). 
 11. Id. ¶ 44. 
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There are two main sets of proposals for the multilateral register.  
One group of proposals advocates a voluntary system under which 
notified GIs would be registered in a database.12  Governments 
choosing to participate would have to consult the database when 
making decisions regarding protection in their countries, and non-
participating Members would be “‘encouraged’ but ‘not obliged’ to 
consult the database.”13  The other line of proposals advocates that, 
subject to certain exceptions, registration of a GI would establish a 
presumption of eligibility for protection by all WTO Members.14  The 
presumptions could be challenged on certain grounds, but the register 
would generally require protection from Members.15 
It is important to note that the negotiations for the creation of a 
multilateral register are required under Article 23.4 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, but are now under the Doha agenda and are often 
treated as separate from the question of whether the higher level of 
protection given to wines and spirits should be extended to other 
products.16  However, the multilateral register is undeniably a part of 
Article 23, and for the purposes of this Note, “extension” will include 
extension of Article 23.4. 
 
 12. See Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Special Session, 
Proposal for a Multilateral System for Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications 
for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement, TN/IP/W/5 (Oct. 23, 2002) 
[hereinafter Proposal for a Multilateral System]; Council for Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights Special Session, Multilateral System of Notification and Registration 
of Geographical Indications for Wines (and Spirits),  TN/IP/W/6 (Oct. 29, 2002) [hereinafter 
Multilateral System of Notification and Registration]. 
 13. TRIPS: GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, supra note 1. 
 14. See Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Implementation 
of Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement Relating to the Establishment of a Multilateral System of 
Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications, IP/C/W/107/Rev.1 (June 22, 2000) 
[hereinafter E.U. Proposal]; Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Communication from Hungary, IP/C/W/255 (May 3, 2001) [hereinafter Communication from 
Hungary (2001)] (containing Hungary’s slightly modified proposal that suggests an arbitration 
system to settle differences); Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Special Session, Negotiations Relating to the Establishment of a Multilateral System of 
Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications,  TN/IP/W/3 (June 24, 2002) 
(endorsing both E.U. Proposal  and Communication from Hungary (2001)). 
 15. TRIPS: GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, supra note 1. 
 16. Id.  It should be noted, however, that some countries consider the two issues to be 
related.  Id. 
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C. Homonymous Indications 
Article 23 also protects the co-existence of homonymous GIs for 
wines.17  Homonymous indications are “geographical names which are 
spelled and pronounced alike, but which designate the geographical 
origin of products stemming from different countries.”18  The name 
“Rioja,” for example, designates a region in both Spain and 
Argentina.19 
A number of WTO Members have pushed for the extension of 
Article 23 to goods other than wines and spirits, while other Members 
have dragged their feet and questioned the judicial basis for 
extension.  Members in favor of extension (“demandeurs”) are 
Bulgaria, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, the European Communities, 
Hungary, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, and Turkey.20  
Members opposing extension are Australia, Canada, Columbia, 
Guatemala, New Zealand, Paraguay, the United States, and 
Uruguay.21 
It is the position of this Note that the current hierarchy within 
Section 3 of the TRIPS Agreement is groundless, and that Article 23 
should be expanded to include all GIs. 
I.  THE CONSUMER CONFUSION REQUIREMENT 
The necessity of proving consumer confusion (or unfair 
competition) under Article 22.2 unfairly burdens producers of goods 
covered by the provision in a number of ways.  Most notably, the 
consumer confusion requirement makes legitimately labeled goods 
susceptible to parasitic free-riding.  Because an infringement action 
under Article 22 requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the public 
is misled by the use of the GI, someone producing goods outside the 
region identified by the GI can exploit its reputation if the public is 
 
 17. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 23.3. 
 18. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 8, at 879. 
 19. Id.  It is important to note that there is some dispute over whether this actually 
constitutes an appreciable additional protection for wines and spirits.  See, e.g., Sergio Escuerdo, 
International Protection of Geographical Indications and Developing Countries 29-30 (Trade-
Related Agenda, Development and Equity, Working Paper No. 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/geoindication/geoindications.pdf.  However, this 
dispute has no bearing on the analysis in this Note. 
 20. GERVAIS, supra note 4, at 51. 
 21. Id. 
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not confused by such use.22  So, for example, the unauthorized use of 
protected GIs is legal under Article 22 if de-localizing qualifiers are 
used (for example, “American-style Parma Ham”).23  “Consumers’ 
behaviour can be easily influenced by such improper but nevertheless 
legal use of geographical indications.”24  Article 22 would allow the 
American company making knock-off Parma Ham to rely on the 
investments and labor of generations of Italian producers who have 
infused the GI with an outstanding reputation.  This exploitative use 
of legitimate Gis not only unjustly enriches follow-on producers, but 
also “[diverts] a considerable share of the market away from 
legitimate producers and manufacturers”25 and shortchanges those 
who toil to preserve the reputation and quality of the authentic goods. 
Apart from reducing sales of the product bearing the original GI, 
the free-riding enabled by Article 22 poses risks to the GI itself.  The 
distribution of the follow-on goods can have the effect of diluting or 
tarnishing the original GI.  Indeed, “economists [have] draw[n] 
attention to the adverse impact of ‘diluted reputation’ on account of 
misappropriation of marks.”26  Worse yet, legally permissible free-
riding can sometimes render GIs generic.27  It has been noted by 
demandeurs that under Article 22, there is an ever-present risk of GIs 
becoming generic.28 
In response, Members opposing extension have argued that the 
risk of Article 22 GIs becoming generic is overstated because 
“commercial experience clearly indicates that genuine, internationally 
recognized GIs will always command a premium on world markets.”29  
There are three problems with this retort, however. 
 
 22. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Proposal from 
Bulgaria et al. ¶¶ 10 & 11, IP/C/W/247 (March 29, 2001) [hereinafter Bulgaria Proposal (2001)] 
(noting that free-riding is permitted as long as the product’s true origin is stated). 
 23. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 8, at 879. 
 24. Alexandra Grazioli, The Protection of Geographical Indications, BRIDGES BETWEEN 
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switz.), Jan. 
2002, at 15, available at http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES6-1.pdf. 
 25. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 8, at 881. 
 26. DWIJEN RANGNEKAR, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS: A REVIEW OF PROPOSALS AT 
THE TRIPS COUNCIL: EXTENDING ARTICLE 23 TO PRODUCTS OTHER THAN WINES AND 
SPIRITS 33, available at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/CS_rangnekar.pdf 
[hereinafter RANGNEKAR, REVIEW]. 
 27. Id. at 8. 
 28. See Bulgaria Proposal (2001), supra note 22, ¶ 12. 
 29. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from Argentina et al. ¶ 8, IP/C/W/289 (June 29, 2001) [hereinafter Argentina Communication 
(2001)]. 
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First, even if it were usually the case that the original GIs could 
still command a premium on world markets, it cannot be denied that 
in at least some cases, the risk is fully materialized and GIs are 
emptied of their legal effect by repeated free-riding.30  In light of these 
troubling cases, it is not surprising that some consider the risk of GIs 
becoming generic to be a “key reason” for demanding extension.31 
Second, the mere fact that some premium may be commanded by 
a GI that has been undermined by free-riding does not mean that the 
legitimate GI-holder is benefiting as much as it should be.  The 
original producer should not simply enjoy a slight competitive 
advantage over the follow-on producers—it should be the only one 
benefiting from the GI that signifies the distinctive qualities unique to 
its geographical region.  Although this might appear rather 
protectionist at first blush, it must be remembered that local 
producers are the ones who labor to preserve local traditions and, 
therefore, they are entitled to such market power. 
Third, stringent GI protection may be needed for marks to 
become internationally-recognized and capable of commanding a 
premium in the first place.  The Members opposing extension argue 
that there is no need to worry about GIs being destroyed by free-
riding because the authentic goods originating in the designated 
geographical region will always command a premium.  However, the 
development of the GI’s reputation and its corresponding ability to 
command a premium may be stifled by any free-riding that occurs 
before the original GI becomes internationally recognized as 
signifying distinctive quality.  One can easily imagine a case in which 
Producer B discovers Producer A’s new but promising product— 
“Oslo Ham,” for instance—and creates his own “American-style Oslo 
Ham.”  If the authentic Oslo Ham has not yet established 
preeminence in world markets, it is far from certain that it will 
command a premium over Producer B’s American-style Oslo Ham, 
which is establishing its market share at the same time as the original 
Oslo Ham. 
An additional result of the free-riding enabled by Article 22 is 
that producers in general are discouraged from making investments in 
 
 30. One scholar calls attention to the following “once famous” but now generic GIs: 
Arabica coffee, Indiarubber, Chinaware, Cheddar cheese, and kiwifruit.  See RANGNEKAR, 
REVIEW, supra note 26, at 33. 
 31. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from Bangladesh et al. ¶ 18, IP/C/W/308/Rev.1 (Oct. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Bangladesh 
Communication (2001)]. 
06__LANG.DOC 8/1/2006  3:06 PM 
2006] ARTICLE 23 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 493 
GIs.  Under the current system, GIs are susceptible to parasitic free-
riding that reduces the returns on such investment, and many 
producers would rather take free rides than invest in unique marks.  
In order to reward and stimulate investments throughout the world’s 
markets, it is critical that we protect all GIs as vigorously as those in 
Article 23. 
Article 22’s requirement of consumer confusion also creates 
unnecessary legal uncertainty.  At the outset, it is crucial to realize 
that the very use of public confusion as a prerequisite to an 
infringement action obfuscates the legal proceedings, for “[t]o take 
public opinion as the decisive criterion in granting protection results 
in unpredictable and uncertain protection, dependent on time and 
place.”32  Even aside from the problems inherent in using consumer 
confusion as the benchmark, there is clearly wide judicial discretion in 
the application of such a standard.  “The proof required under Article 
22 allows wide, if not to say arbitrary, judicial discretion, particularly 
in terms of the test to demonstrate that the public is misled.”33  It is 
impossible to predict whether a given judge, who may very well 
decide the consumer confusion issue differently from other judges 
abroad or even at home, will be convinced by the plaintiff’s case for 
consumer confusion.  “A horizontal goal of the WTO Agreements 
and a common interest of WTO Members is to establish and ensure a 
fair and predictable legal framework within which international trade 
can flourish.”34  However, this goal is undermined by the 
unsatisfactory provisions of Article 22. 
Moreover, the burden of proof promulgated in Article 22 creates 
excessive and unnecessary costs for plaintiffs.  While holders of 
Article 23 GIs are protected by a per se rule against unauthorized 
use,35 and, therefore, incur relatively few costs in litigating their GI 
claims,36 holders of Article 22 GIs face appreciable enforcement costs 
as a result of their burden of proof.  “The general protection of 
Article 22, in cases of litigation leads . . . to the onerous situation that 
the legitimate producers needs [sic] not only prove that there is 
 
 32. Id. ¶ 10. 
 33. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 8, at 881. 
 34. Bulgaria Proposal (2001), supra note 22, ¶ 18. 
 35. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art 23.1.  See also RANGNEKAR, REVIEW, supra 
note 26, at 34 (“[P]rotection under Article 23 requires the rather simple test of establishing 
whether the product originates from the place indicated by the GI.”). 
 36. RANGNEKAR, REVIEW, supra note 26, at 34. 
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illegitimate use of the GI, but—in addition—that such a use misleads 
the public or constitutes an act of unfair competition.”37 
This cost may be prohibitive in many cases, especially for 
producers in developing countries.  Plaintiffs who are saddled with 
the tough decision of whether to engage in costly and time-consuming 
litigation may not proceed if the infringement is anything less than 
obvious or if the infringement is done on a small enough scale that 
the cost of litigation would outweigh the market detriment.  The 
current system has thus created an unsavory incentive for 
manufacturers to engage in low-impact infringements that are 
unlikely to be brought to the attention of a court.  When plaintiffs 
have the legal right to exclude defendants’ marks from the market, 
the unnecessary costs created by the discriminatory provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement should not stand as obstacles.  One group of 
Members opposing extension argued that Article 22 is sufficient to 
protect GIs, but that it is rarely used.38  An obvious response is that 
the infrequency with which Article 22 is used may imply that it is 
simply too expensive to use in many cases.  Whatever the specific 
impact, it cannot be denied that “[t]he relative difference between 
Articles 22 and 23 in terms of the efforts required by a claimant to 
prove infringement have [sic] clear economic consequences in terms 
of the effectiveness of protection and the concomitant risk of 
rendering an indication generic.”39 
II.  THE SECTION 3 HIERARCHY 
The hierarchy in Section 3 of the TRIPS Agreement is 
groundless and theoretically indefensible.  At the outset, it is critical 
to be aware that the hierarchy was not the product of any compelling 
justification, but merely the result of negotiations during the Uruguay 
Round.40  Different provisions were drafted for different types of 
goods because “[n]egotiators accepted the demands of a number of 
 
 37. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 8, at 881. 
 38. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from Argentina et al. ¶ 6, IP/C/W/386 (Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Argentina Communication 
(2002)]. 
 39. RANGNEKAR, REVIEW, supra note 26, at 34. 
 40. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from Bulgaria et al. ¶ 6, IP/C/W/204 (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Bulgaria Proposal (2000)]; see 
also Jim Keon, Intellectual Property Rules for Trademarks and Geographical Indications: 
Important Parts of the New World Trade Order, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 165, 174 (Carlos Correa & Abdulqawi 
Yusuf eds., 1998). 
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wine-producing participants, notably in the European Union, that 
wanted a higher level of protection for wines and spirits than the 
standard applied to geographical indications in general. The addition 
of spirits occurred at the end of the negotiations.”41  One submission 
on the issue of extension explains that the compromise was due to the 
link at that time between the negotiations on GIs and negotiations on 
agriculture.42  “Given this link, the higher level of protection for wines 
and spirits was granted solely for the political reason of persuading 
the European Union . . . to join consensus on the Uruguay Round 
package, in spite of strong opposition on part of many other 
countries.”43  Drafting the TRIPS Agreement was far from an 
unadulterated exercise in intellectual property theory because the 
intellectual property concerns were tied to agricultural policy 
questions that the TRIPS Agreement was to resolve.  Even Members 
opposing extension have recognized in a recent submission that the 
source of the distinction between goods resulted only from 
negotiations among Members: 
If the extension discussion were purely one of intellectual property 
policy, it would make sense to treat all products in the same 
manner legally.  However, we note that the WTO TRIPS Council 
discussions take place in the context of trade policy and the 
additional protection provided geographical indications for wines 
and spirits resulted from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations.44 
Given that the GI extension debate has reached something of an 
impasse,45 this recognition could be regarded as at least a step in the 
right direction.  Indeed, one commentator observes that “[t]he only 
notable change in this debate has been an acceptance by Members 
opposing GI-extension that there is no rational or legal basis for the 
hierarchy in the level of protection.”46 
Treating different types of goods differently for purposes of GI 
protection is also unjustified because the definition of GIs does not 
 
 41. GERVAIS, supra note 4, at 196. 
 42. See Bulgaria Proposal (2000), supra note 40, ¶ 6. 
 43. Kasturi Das, Geographical Indications in Jeopardy, INDIA TOGETHER, Apr. 2004, 
http://www.indiatogether.org/2004/apr/eco-tradeGIs.htm. 
 44. Argentina Communication (2002), supra note 38, ¶ 3. 
 45. TRIPS: GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, supra note 1 (“Members remain deeply 
divided, with no agreement in sight.”). 
 46. DWIJEN RANGNEKAR, THE SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS: A 
REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE 8 (2004) [hereinafter RANGNEKAR, SOCIO-
ECONOMICS]. 
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distinguish between product types.47  Nothing in Article 22.1 suggests 
that different types of GIs are meant to be treated differently.  Also, 
“the debate on GI-extension is not concerned with the definition of 
GIs (Article 22.1) but with the inherent hierarchy in the level of 
protection in Section 3.”48  Positing a distinction between different 
categories of a singularly defined intellectual property right is 
inconsistent with the rest of the TRIPS Agreement, because no other 
singularly defined intellectual property right has different levels of 
protection for different categories of goods.49  Indeed, demandeurs 
have pointed to the anomalous treatment of GIs as support for the 
proposition that the Section 3 hierarchy is groundless.50 
From a commercial perspective, there is no salient difference 
between GIs on wines and spirits and those on other goods.  After 
establishing that the authors of the TRIPS Agreement had no special 
reason for distinguishing between wines and other types of goods, one 
must ask whether there is in fact any juridical or economic basis for 
the distinction that would justify its continued presence in the 
Agreement.  The answer is no.  The trade value of a GI—and the 
corresponding need to safeguard it from appropriation—is no greater 
in the case of wines and spirits.  “In fact, very often, the trade value of 
GIs for products other than wines and spirits is observed to be even 
higher than a specific GI designating a wine or a spirit.”51  Famous 
examples include “Darjeeling tea,” “Carolina rice,”  “Maine lobster,” 
and “Bukhara carpets.”52 
The bottom line is that, “[w]hile the TRIPS Agreement heralds a 
significant upgrading of the standards of protection for indications of 
geographical origin . . . there remains the problem of a hierarchy in 
the levels of protection based on an arbitrary categorisation of 
goods.”53  Unless and until the Section 3 hierarchy—which was 
derived from a political bargain rather than from a principled choice 
about intellectual property policy—is eliminated, the integrity of the 
 
 47. Article 22.1 reads, “[g]eographical indications are, for the purposes of this Agreement, 
indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or 
locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is 
essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 22.1. 
 48. RANGNEKAR, REVIEW, supra note 26, at 7. 
 49. Das, supra note 43. 
 50. Bulgaria Proposal (2001), supra note 22, ¶ 15. 
 51. Das, supra note 43. 
 52. Bulgaria Proposal (2001), supra note 22, ¶16. 
 53. RANGNEKAR, SOCIO-ECONOMICS, supra note 46, at 1. 
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TRIPS Agreement as an intellectual property instrument will remain 
questionable. 
III.  EFFECTS ON THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
In many ways, the disparity between Articles 22 and 23 
disproportionately burdens developing countries.  Most notably, the 
disparity exacerbates the economic differences between developing 
countries and developed countries.  Article 22 does not prohibit the 
unauthorized use of a GI by a producer in a different locale, as long 
as the true origin of the goods is indicated.54  Consequently, 
manufacturers who can engage in large-scale imitation of the goods of 
others enjoy a comparative advantage over those producers who 
cannot.  The disparity between Articles 22 and 23 favors countries 
with greater production capacities that enable them to free-ride (the 
United States, for example), and works to the disadvantage of 
countries that depend on other forms of production, such as 
agriculture.  Thus, businesses in more-developed countries can simply 
appropriate the GIs established in less-developed countries, append 
some special qualifier (such as “type”), and out-market the original 
producers.  For example, “Kraft and other companies generate 
millions of dollars annually from sales of inexpensive parmesan 
cheese, which takes its name from the world class Parmigiano 
Reggiano.”55  Of course, Italy is not a developing country—the point 
is simply that businesses in the United States and other developed 
countries are in a much better position to engage in free-riding than 
businesses in developing countries, which must rely on innovative or 
distinctive techniques to stay competitive.  Thus, “[t]he effect of 
adopting a system of geographical indications at the global level is 
immediately troubling for many corporations in the United States, 
and explains much of the U.S. opposition to GIs in WTO 
negotiations.”56 
Developing countries need increased GI protection if they are to 
gain market power.  First of all, stronger GI protection would attract 
investment in regional products, which abound in developing 
countries.  As one commentator explained: 
 
 54. See discussion supra Part I. 
 55. Bruce A. Babcock, Geographical Indications, Property Rights, and Value-Added 
Agriculture, IOWA AGRIC. REV. 1, 2 (2003). 
 56. Elizabeth Barham, Translating Terroir: The Global Challenge of French AOC Labeling, 
19 J. RURAL STUD. 127, 128 (2003). 
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[Increasing international protection for GIs] would immediately 
increase the incentive to create and register new products and 
brand names based on geographic origin.  Regional foods could be 
marketed internationally with less risk that their niche would be 
overwhelmed by domestic competition.  That is, protection of the 
GI would increase the incentive to create new brands because 
future competition would be limited.57 
Strengthening or expanding any intellectual property right makes 
investments more secure and consequently raises levels of 
investment.  GIs are no different.  Expanding the scope of Article 23 
“would increase the value of GIs and encourage more quality and 
niche products to be put on the world’s markets.”58  Because there 
may be untapped, unique niche products in developing countries, 
increased GI protection will attract investors to these regions, rather 
than to the places where follow-on goods can be produced in mass 
quantities.  That is why “[d]eveloping countries . . . could benefit most 
from an effective protection of GIs.  GIs contribute in a positive way 
to a business-friendly investment climate.”59 
It is critical for long-term development that developing countries 
increase their investment levels.  Eventually, increased investment 
due to heightened GI protection would allow producers in developing 
countries to develop economies of scale.60  Development through 
foreign investment would help close the gap between developing and 
developed countries—hence the need to capitalize on the opportunity 
to increase investment in regional products by expanding the 
coverage of Article 23. 
Additionally, extension would help developing countries gain 
market power because GIs frequently protect the types of products 
common to developing countries.  For several years, there has been 
discussion of various methods of supporting and compensating 
indigenous and local communities who preserve and utilize their 
regions’ biological diversity.61  Among proposed solutions involving 
intellectual property rights, GIs have been identified as being 
especially promising because they tend to protect the types of goods 
 
 57. Babcock, supra note 55, at 3. 
 58. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 8, at 866. 
 59. Felix Addor et al., Geographical Indications: Important Issues for Industrialized and 
Developing Countries, THE IPTS REPORT, May 2003, at 29 (citation omitted). 
 60. See id. 
 61. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 8, at 893. 
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that are most common to developing societies.62  If a good is to bear a 
GI, it must have special qualities attributable to the good’s 
geographical source.63  Logically, this would occur most frequently in 
those countries where there are unique pockets of nature that have 
not been adulterated by extensive development.  Moreover, GI goods 
“tend to be from the rural, agricultural and handicraft sectors of the 
economy” further implicating the interests of developing countries.64  
This helps to explain why “[a]s a public policy instrument, GIs have 
potentially positive implications towards the protection of indigenous 
knowledge and as a means for generating livelihood and income.”65 
It is important not to understate the economic potential of GIs or 
the corresponding urgency of the need to extend GI protection. 
Mexico’s experience with regard to Tequila is a prime example of 
the considerable financial benefits that can arise from the exclusive 
rights granted through geographical indications: increased Tequila 
exports combined with the production monopoly inherent in 
geographical indications have increased the price of domestic 
inputs sharply (notably that of agave) and, thus generated 
considerable windfall profits (economic rents) for Mexican 
producers.66  
It is not just the countries in favor of extension that acknowledge the 
economic and political value of protecting GIs;67 countries opposing 
extension acknowledge it as well.68  If we are to create a just 
international order that gives effect to critical intellectual property 
rights and promotes economic equality between the North and South, 
we must allow developing countries to partake in the undeniable 
economic advantage of GIs. 
In response to the contention that increased protection of GIs 
would benefit the developing world, it has been argued that extension 
 
 62. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Review of Existing Intellectual Property 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge, at 6, 13-14, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/7 (May 6, 2002); see also 
Addor et al., supra note 59, at 29 (explaining that GIs “reward the preservation of traditional 
products while allowing for continued evolution”). 
 63. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 22.1. 
 64. RANGNEKAR SOCIO-ECONOMICS, supra note 46, at 1. 
 65. Id. at 3. 
 66. Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat: Trade Policy Review, Mexico, ¶ 
227, WT/TPR/S/97 (Mar. 12, 2002). 
 67. See Bulgaria Proposal (2001), supra note 22, ¶ 2; see also Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from New Zealand: Geographical 
Indications and the Article 24.2 Review, ¶.2, IP/C/W/205 (Sept. 18, 2000). 
 68. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from Australia, ¶  2, IP/C/W/211 (Oct. 19, 2000); RANGNEKAR, REVIEW, supra note 26, at 30. 
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would actually be disadvantageous to developing countries because 
their legal and administrative capacities are currently limited and 
would require costly expansion.69  As a consequence, it is argued, the 
benefits of extension to the developing world might well be 
outweighed by the costs of accommodating the new changes.70  There 
is no cause for alarm, however, for three reasons. 
First, developing countries need not be held to the same 
implementation obligations as their developed counterparts.  Indeed, 
the delayed onset of compliance obligations for developing countries 
is not new in the TRIPS context.  While the TRIPS Agreement took 
effect in developed countries on January 1, 1996, developing 
countries had until January 1, 2000 to comply with the TRIPS 
standards with respect to geographical indications.71  Extension of 
Article 23 could be accompanied by special implementation 
exceptions for developing countries that would soften the blow of the 
new obligations. 
Second, Members have wide discretion over how to fulfill their 
TRIPS obligations.  The TRIPS Agreement itself plainly states that 
“Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal 
system and practice.”72  In the general spirit of being unconstrained 
with regard to implementation, developing countries could probably 
find ways to minimize the cost of compliance following substantive 
changes in the TRIPS Agreement.  In any event, developing countries 
are already required to protect GIs with regard to wines and spirits 
pursuant to Article 23, so presumably these Members already have 
some legal regime under which GIs can be given their full effect.  The 
scope of goods covered by Article 23 would be different if extension 
occurred, but there is no reason to believe that any new legal 
mechanisms would be needed.73 
Third, limited short-term costs should not be treated as reasons 
to avoid opportunities for long-term development.  Eventually, 
developing counties will be much better off as a result of the 
additional GI protections.  Given the widely-recognized economic 
 
 69. See Addor et al., supra note 59, at 29. 
 70. See Argentina Communication (2001), supra note 29, ¶¶ 14-17. 
 71. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 65. 
 72. Id. art. 1.1. 
 73. See RANGNEKAR, REVIEW, supra note 26, at 28 (citing Bangladesh Communication 
(2001), supra note 31, ¶¶ 14-16) (“GI-extension does not create any new obligation per se, but is 
only a demand for change in the product coverage of Article 23.”). 
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potential of GIs74 and the concentration of GI-friendly goods in 
developing countries,75 it cannot be seriously questioned that 
developing countries stand to gain significantly from stronger GI 
protection.  Indeed, “unlike any other IP-instrument in the TRIPS 
Agreement, demandeurs for stronger protection include many 
developing countries.”76 
IV.  THE MULTILATERAL REGISTER 
The holders of GIs covered by Article 22 are slighted by the fact 
that the TRIPS Agreement calls for negotiations to create a 
multilateral register for GIs on Article 23 goods,77 but not for any 
other type of GI.  Indeed, a multilateral register has the potential to 
be extraordinarily useful. 
First, a multilateral register would greatly benefit holders of 
registered GIs because it would enable Members to be on timely 
notice of these GIs and take appropriate measures (for example, 
denying trademark registration requests for trademarks containing 
registered GIs pursuant to Article 23.2).78  Because the development 
of a GI’s reputation requires significant investment and labor, 
timeliness in GI disputes is critical, and the timely notice offered by 
the multilateral register would benefit all parties.  Most obviously, the 
registration system would benefit holders of registered GIs because it 
would prevent free-riding, as well as unintentional appropriation, 
before they happen. 
Without the benefit of the register, a Member government might 
unwittingly register a conflicting trademark (or confirm some other 
analogous intellectual property right), forcing the legitimate holder of 
the GI to undo the damage in court.  Insofar as the register would 
allow Members to better protect foreign GIs, the holders of these GIs 
would not have to go out of their way to prevent Members from 
issuing infringing marks or to litigate such infringement after the fact.  
Crucially, the timely notice offered by the register would also 
 
 74. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70. 
 75. See supra text accompanying note 66. 
 76. RANGNEKAR, SOCIO-ECONOMICS, supra note 46, at 1. 
 77. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 23.4. 
 78. See European Communities, Negotiations Relating to the Establishment of a Multilateral 
System of Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications—Issues for Discussion at the 
Special Session of the TRIPS Council of 28 June 2002—Informal Note, ¶ 22, JOB(02)/70 (June 
24, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/intell_property/wto_nego/ 
intel4c.htm [hereinafter Negotiations Relating to the Establishment of a Multilateral System]. 
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minimize costs to the would-be producers of the infringing goods 
because they would be able to avoid the mistake of investing in marks 
that would eventually be discontinued.  Because the register would 
actually serve to minimize the possibility that producers would 
mistakenly use registered GIs, the cost of product or label 
withdrawals underscored by Members critical of extension79 may be 
overstated. 
Second, a multilateral register would make it easier for holders 
of GIs to defend their intellectual property in court and reduce the 
cost of conducting this defense.  If the registered GIs were given the 
presumption of eligibility for protection as proposed by the European 
Union80 and Hungary,81 the cost savings associated with the defense of 
a registered mark would be profound, as the plaintiff would bear 
virtually no burden of proof beyond pointing to the register.  
However, even if registered GIs were not given the presumption of 
eligibility for protection, as in the “joint paper” proposal,82 building a 
case from scratch would be easier because the register would stand as 
strong evidence supporting the GI’s legitimacy. 
Third, if a multilateral register were created for all types of GIs, 
GI holders “would have a clearer view regarding countries in which 
their GIs might have become generic.”83  Such knowledge “would 
facilitate investment and export decisions.”84 
Members who are skeptical of the advent of the register have 
pointed to a number of costs they associate with creation of a 
multilateral register.  Before considering any costs, however, it is 
important to note not only that the required costs would vary under 
the different register proposals,85 but also that the debate over costs is 
limited by the lack of information on the probable number of 
registrants. That noted, the main costs identified are those associated 
with: (1) implementing any new national legislation or examination 
procedures;86 (2) challenging the registration of contentious GIs87 
(note that this is only an issue under the European Union and 
 
 79. See Argentina Communication (2001), supra note 29, ¶ 21. 
 80. E.U. Proposal, supra note 14. 
 81. Communication from Hungary (2001), supra note 14. 
 82. Proposal for a Multilateral System, supra note 12. 
 83. Discussions on the Establishment of a Multilateral System, supra note 10, ¶ 129. 
 84. See id. (citing Minutes of Meeting of 20 September 2002, supra note 10, ¶ 73). 
 85. See Minutes of Meeting of 20 September 2002, supra note 10, ¶ 76. 
 86. See id. ¶ 77. 
 87. Minutes of Meeting of 28 June 2002, supra note 10, ¶ 78. 
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Hungary proposals, where registration is of more import and signifies 
a presumption of eligibility for protection); and (3) administering the 
register (presumably, this would be done by the Secretariat).88 
These concerns over the cost of creating a multilateral register 
may be rebutted. First, nothing in Article 23.4 requires the type of 
register proposed by the European Union and Hungary (whose 
proposals also include increased legal obligations, a presumption of 
eligibility for protection for registered GIs, and limited opposition 
windows).89  Instead, a system more like the low-cost, database-type 
register posited in the “joint paper” could be authorized.90  “There 
would be some costs—compiling notifications in the agreed format, 
those arising out of any opposition under national law, monitoring 
national geographical indications to notify new ones or withdraw 
lapsed ones—but these would be less than under the other 
proposals.”91  Any nominal costs associated with the less demanding 
register cannot reasonably be understood to outweigh the benefits of 
notification and registration.  Furthermore, under the less demanding 
proposal, countries that find involvement with the register to be 
unprofitable could take a laissez faire approach to the register; 
participation is not required.92 
Second, it must be remembered that the registration system is 
not meant to create obligations additional to those each Member 
must already fulfill.93  Any obligations to protect GIs would not derive 
from the register, but from the TRIPS Agreement,94 which Members 
are already required to follow.  Indeed, one submission identifies a 
critical distinction between Article 23.4, which refers only to 
facilitation, and Article 24.1, which refers to increasing protection 
under Article 23.95 
Third, the registration system may actually help Members save 
money.  Having available the means to identify registered GIs would 
actually facilitate the implementation of Members’ existing 
obligations.  As noted above, for example, governments could more 
 
 88. E.U. Proposal, supra note 14, ¶¶ 132-36. 
 89. Id.; Communication from Hungary (2001), supra note 14. 
 90. Proposal for a Multilateral System, supra note 12; Multilateral System of Notification 
and Registration, supra note 12. 
 91. Discussions on the Establishment of a Multilateral System, supra note 10, ¶ 123. 
 92. TRIPS: GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, supra note 1. 
 93. See Discussions on the Establishment of a Multilateral System, supra note 10, ¶ 44. 
 94. See id. ¶ 44 (citing Minutes of Meeting of 28 June 2002, supra note 10, ¶ 80). 
 95. Id. ¶ 44 (citing Minutes of Meeting of 28 June 2002, supra note 10, ¶¶ 70, 77). 
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easily avoid registering trademarks that conflict with registered GIs.  
Furthermore, the register would diminish usurpation, which, in turn, 
would diminish litigation and save money for the parties as well as the 
judiciary.96 
Finally, the long-term benefits of the register would outweigh 
any short-term costs.  “A system genuinely helping producers, 
consumers and administrations to get protection under Article 23 
could more than justify higher implementation costs than one which 
provides no such help.”97 
V.  THE MANDATES OF ARTICLE 24 
Article 24, which requires future negotiations of the Section 3 
provisions, arguably requires Members to negotiate an extension of 
Article 23 to cover other types of GIs.  The first key provision to 
consider is Article 24.1, which reads, “Members agree to enter into 
negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of individual 
geographical indications under Article 23.”98  Some Members 
reasonably take this to mean that the universe of GIs covered by the 
article should expand.99  Others have responded that “the built-in 
mandate should only cover an increase or extension of the protection 
of individual geographical indications for wines and spirits.”100 
However, the latter interpretation is problematic because if 
Article 24.1 were taken to mean that there should only be 
forthcoming increases in protection for Article 23 goods, then the 
groundless hierarchy between product categories would be 
exacerbated.  Or, in the words of Bulgaria and eight other 
demandeurs, “such an approach would add to the imbalances already 
existing in Section 3 which is not consistent with the spirit and basic 
objectives of the TRIPS Agreement.”101  Furthermore, while Article 
23 is explicitly limited to wines and spirits, Article 24.1 refers to all 
 
 96. Negotiations Relating to the Establishment of a Multilateral System, supra note 78, ¶ 22. 
 97. Discussions on the Establishment of a Multilateral System, supra note 10, ¶ 119. 
 98. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 24.1. 
 99. See, e.g., Bulgaria Proposal (2000), supra note 40, ¶ 11. 
 100. Id. 12.  See also Roland Knaak, The Protection of Geographical Indications According 
to the TRIPS Agreement, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS—THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED 
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 135-39 (Friederich-Karl Beier & Gerhard 
Schricker eds., 1996) (explaining that Article 24 is only meant to introduce the possibility of 
extending Article 23 to cases where exceptions previously applied – for example, “Chablis,” 
“Burgundy” and “Champagne,” which currently fall under the exception in Article 24.4). 
 101. Bulgaria Proposal (2000), supra note 40, ¶ 12. 
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categories of goods, except where the provisions expressly indicate 
otherwise.102 
Even if Article 24.1 were not construed to require negotiations 
regarding extension, Article 24.2 still requires the Council to “take 
such actions as may be agreed to facilitate the operation and further 
the objectives of this Section.”103  This provision can be read to 
instruct the TRIPS Council to expand the scope of Article 23.  
Indeed, “the Doha Ministerial Declaration instructs the TRIPS 
Council to discuss ‘outstanding implementation issues’ as a matter of 
priority [and] GI extension exists as Tiret 87 in the Compilation of 
Outstanding Implementation Issues.”104  Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that “the TRIPS Council reported to the 1996 Ministerial 
Conference in Singapore explicitly ‘that a review of the application of 
the provisions of the Section on Geographical Indications as provided 
for in Article 24.2 . . . permits inputs from delegations on the issue of 
scope . . . .’”105 
VI.  MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXTENSION 
CONSIDERED 
One common argument against extension is that a certain level 
of free-riding may actually enhance the intrinsic value of a GI.106  
Indeed, it can be argued that the very fact that a product and its GI 
are imitated may demonstrate the worthiness of the product and the 
power of the GI.  However, there are several problems with this line 
of reasoning.  First, the value of the GI can actually be damaged by 
the distribution of out-of-region substitute goods if the free-riding 
product is sub-par.  In other words, rather than being impressed that 
the original GI was emulated, consumers would think less of the 
original good through association with the substitute good.  One pair 
of commentators confirms the following: 
Free-riding on the good reputation of the GI good would clearly 
create the risk of the region’s reputation being undermined.  As a 
consequence consumers would be willing to pay less for GI quality 
 
 102. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 23, 24.1. 
 103. Id. art. 24.2. 
 104. RANGNEKAR, REVIEW, supra note 26, at 32 (citing Ministerial Conference, 
Implementation Related Issues and Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 14, 2001)). 
 105. Bulgaria Proposal (2000), supra note 40, ¶ 14 (quoting Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Report (1996) of the Council for TRIPS, ¶ 34, IP/C/8 (Nov. 
6, 1996)). 
 106. See Argentina Communication (2001), supra note 29, attachment, ¶ 8. 
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goods and producers would—from a socially optimal point of 
view—underinvest in informal innovation and in the development 
of products offering higher quality and safety.107 
Second, even if the non-misleading, free-riding goods are not sub-par, 
their distribution can dilute a GI or raise the risk of reclassification of 
the original GI as generic.  Third, endorsing the appropriation of GIs 
because such appropriation is flattering could create a slippery slope, 
as such reasoning could be applied to virtually any other intellectual 
property dispute.  Members in favor of extension state that “such a 
line of argument seems to lead to dangerous waters when applied to 
other fields of intellectual property rights.  There is no valid argument 
why it should be different for geographical indications.”108 
The major remaining arguments against extension assert that the 
undertaking would be too costly to be worthwhile.  Before 
considering the individual costs identified by Members opposing 
extension, it is important to note that the costs to WTO Members of 
implementing additional protection for GIs for all products would be 
negligible in comparison with the costs of implementing the 
obligations of the Uruguay Round.109This is at least partly because 
“the level and frequency of use of GIs is relatively limited compared 
to any other IPRs [intellectual property rights].”110 
A. Costs to Governments 
The first group of costs identified by the opposition are those 
that would burden Member governments.  It is argued that expanding 
the scope of goods covered by Article 23 would necessitate the 
introduction of new administrative mechanisms, the financial and 
administrative cost of which would outweigh the benefits of 
extension.111  In one submission, skeptical Members argue that if 
extension occurs, “countries will have to institute a system that 
protects a wide variety of products and may have to change 
fundamental concepts in their laws.”112 
Worries about the costs of extension to governments are 
overstated.  Members are already required to provide the legal means 
 
 107. Addor et al., supra note 59, at 25. 
 108. Bangladesh Communication (2001), supra note 31, ¶ 18. 
 109. See Michael Blakeney, Proposals for the International Regulation of Geographical 
Indications, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 629, 649-50 (2001). 
 110. RANGNEKAR, REVIEW, supra note 26, at 35. 
 111. See Argentina Communication (2001), supra note 29, ¶¶ 14-18. 
 112. Argentina Communication (2002), supra note 38, ¶ 14. 
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for parties to defend their Article 23 GIs.  Expanding the universe of 
goods covered should not require any new legal or administrative 
mechanisms.  In other words, if Members are properly complying 
with Article 23, they should already have these mechanisms in place.  
Consequently, “extending strong GI protection to other products 
should not involve any significant additional administrative 
burden.”113  Furthermore, it is crucial to remember that Members are 
still free to protect GIs through their existing legal regimes as they see 
fit under Article 1.1.  The spirit of this provision has always been one 
of latitude and discretion—indeed, there is no single, talismanic 
method of implementing TRIPS obligations.  As long as Members 
provide some way to give effect to Article 23 GIs, they are free to 
minimize costs where they can.  Additionally, Article 23 does not 
impose any positive obligations on Members to enforce protection for 
GIs; all they have to do is provide the legal means to prevent misuse 
of GIs. 
B. Costs to Consumers 
Members opposing extension argue that it would create two 
additional costs for consumers.  First, they worry that extension could 
imply search and transaction costs resulting from consumer confusion 
caused by the need to re-name and re-label products, as well as by the 
disappearance of terms customarily used to identify products.114  
However, the need to re-name and re-label products may be 
overstated because Article 24 protects certain existing uses: (1) it 
exempts the use of GIs for wines and spirits provided that the GIs 
had been in continuous use for at least ten years prior to 1994115 (there 
is no reason to suppose that after extension this provision would not 
apply mutatis mutandis to GIs currently covered by Article 22); (2) it 
exempts acquired rights pertaining to trademarks already “applied for 
or registered in good faith” or to marks “acquired through use in 
good faith”;116 and (3) it exempts GIs that have become generic or 
customary terms in Member states.117  At least some uses of protected 
 
 113. Dwijen Rangnekar, The Pros and Cons of Stronger Geographical Indication Protection, 
BRIDGES BETWEEN TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., 
Geneva, Switz.), Jan. 2002, at 3, 4, available at http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES 
6-3.pdf. 
 114. See Argentina Communication (2001), supra note 29, ¶ 21. 
 115. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 24.4. 
 116. Id. art. 24.5. 
 117. Id. art. 24.6. 
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GIs that would otherwise be prohibited by Article 23 would be 
protected by Article 24.  With regard to those goods that would need 
to be re-labeled, the worry about costs to consumers is a legitimate 
one, but it is simply too short-sighted: “Clearly, there will be some 
confusion as some labels will vanish or be changed.  This, all parties 
agree, is a short/medium term problem.”118 
Second, Members opposing extension argue that it would make 
finding substitute goods more difficult for consumers.  In situations 
where the authentic good is unavailable due to its cost or some other 
limitation, consumers should have easy-to-find alternatives.  Where 
the real Parma Ham is too expensive, for example, consumers should 
be able to turn to “American-style Parma Ham.” 
This criticism of extension is indeed an important one and may 
counsel in favor of hesitation, but there is one major weakness: 
consumers today appear to be more concerned with finding authentic, 
traditional, quality goods—which are more easily identifiable in a 
world with stringent GI protection—than with finding substitute 
goods.  A number of commentators have observed that “[consumers] 
are looking for quality products—in other words, authentic products 
with a solid tradition behind them—and they are influenced by their 
social conscience when choosing products.”119  In other words: 
The economic and political significance of geographical indications 
is growing as increasing quality awareness and higher quality 
requirements promote the demand for products of a specific 
geographical origin . . . .  That is why, since the end of the Uruguay 
Round, the awareness of the need for an extension of additional 
protection to products other than wines and spirits has continuously 
increased and spread among Members.120 
In response to the claim that extension would make it easier for 
consumers to identify traditional quality goods, it could be argued 
that Article 22 already protects against consumer confusion, so 
consumers should have no trouble finding these goods.  However, 
consumers are only protected from misleading GIs after infringement 
 
 118. RANGNEKAR, REVIEW, supra note 26, at 35. 
 119. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 8, at 874.  See also RANGNEKAR, SOCIO-ECONOMICS, 
supra note 46, at 2 (arguing that there is a growing interest among consumers in “qualitative 
aspects of foodstuffs, as reflected in the growth of market segments like ‘organic’, ‘fair trade’, 
and ‘authentic’ to name a few”); Addor et al., supra note 59, at 28 (“Extension would facilitate 
consumers’ choice since they would be assured that products using a GI actually originate from 
where the GI indicates . . . .  Extension . . . would ensure that [consumers] can trust in their 
choice when opting for a product using a GI.”). 
 120. Bulgaria Proposal (2000), supra note 40, ¶ 7. 
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litigation has been brought against producers using the confusing 
labels.  This not only means that confusing marks can circulate 
through the market before the trial and while the trial is pending, but 
also that the consumer is left confused in those cases that do not go to 
court—perhaps because the distribution of confusing goods is limited, 
because the litigation costs would be prohibitive, or because the 
chances of success are uncertain.  Additionally, there may be cases 
where the courts decline to find consumer confusion, but where at 
least some consumers are in fact confused. 
C. Costs to Producers 
Finally, those who oppose extension argue that it would 
compromise the investments of producers who have been using marks 
that are not confusing but are similar to legitimate GIs, and might 
even lead to the closure of certain markets.121  In other words, they 
fear that any goods that currently use GIs from other regions 
combined with de-localizing qualifiers such as “style” or “type” would 
have to be discontinued.  Of course, this would constitute a burden 
for producers who rely on this technique, but this is only a one-time 
cost.  Once the market had adjusted to the change in the TRIPS 
Agreement, the costs of transition would be in the past, unlike the 
benefits of extension, which would be everlasting.  Furthermore, the 
blow to producers would presumably be softened by the “existing 
use” exceptions embodied in Article 24.122  “The exceptions contained 
in Article 24 would apply to ‘extension’ just as they currently do for 
GIs for wines and spirits today.  They take due account of hitherto 
existing good faith use of GIs for products without the relevant 
origin.”123  If the blow to producers were still not soft enough, the 
extension of Article 23 to new types of GIs could be accompanied by 
some kind of accommodating implementation exceptions.  For 
example, goods that would be made illegal by the change could be 
phased out, rather than immediately pulled from the markets.  
Alternatively, the prerequisites to the existing use exceptions under 
Article 24 could be lowered (for example, by changing the ten-year 
requirement of Article 24.4 to a five-year requirement in these special 
circumstances).  The bottom line is that the TRIPS Agreement has 
 
 121. See, e.g., Argentina Communication (2001), supra note 29, ¶ 24 (warning that 
governments of importing countries may claim exclusive rights to descriptions used to market 
products, thus leading to the closure of potential export markets). 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19. 
 123. Addor et al., supra note 59, at 28. 
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always been accommodating with regard to implementation, and 
there is no reason to believe it could not be so here. 
Moreover, any costs that might befall producers would be 
counterbalanced by the benefits of extension.  While certain 
investment-backed expectations of some producers might be 
undermined by extension, producers would be better off in the long 
run because extension would allow them in general to be more 
confident in their investments (since stronger intellectual property 
rights make for more secure investments) and expend fewer resources 
defending their GIs in court.  “The economic long-term benefits of 
extending the more effective protection of GIs to all products would 
clearly in any case outweigh the costs for the few cases where re-
labeling might be necessary.”124 
CONCLUSION 
Extension of Article 23 to cover other types of goods is long 
overdue for six main reasons.  First, the consumer confusion 
requirement in Article 22 is a great and unnecessary burden on GI 
holders.  Second, the hierarchy between product categories 
embedded in Articles 22 and 23 resulted from a political compromise 
and is indefensible today.  Third, the disparity between the two 
articles frustrates the development of the developing world.  Fourth, 
it is unfair that Article 22 producers do not enjoy the prospect of an 
extremely useful multilateral register.  Fifth, multiple provisions of 
Article 24 appear to require the TRIPS Council to negotiate 
extension.  Finally, the costs associated with extension have been 
overstated and in fact would be outweighed by the benefits of 
extension. 
As global  trade becomes more free, it is more important to 
vigorously protect geographical indications and other forms of 
intellectual property that allow producers to be profitable despite 
follow-on competition from abroad. 
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